Video Infoblog: The Illegality of Israel’s Control in Palestinian Territories, including Gaza, Ralph Wilde, 13.12.22
Transcript
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I will then pass it on to you Ralph Ralph is a professor of law at UCL
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um University College London is uh expert in international law and
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self-determination and the mandate system and he uh will be
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talking to us speaking of today about his uh I think long quite long standing
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now project about uh uh the illegality
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of Israeli presence in the West Bank is in Gaza is that is that a good title or
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yes okay uh so thank you Ralph for being with us
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thank you very much it's a great pleasure uh to be with you I'm sorry that I haven't been able to to join the
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other sessions and indeed that I can't be there in person um it was just too long a trip to have
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to make I'm sorry about that um so today um I I'd like to this afternoon I'd like
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to um present some of the ideas that are um as item I mentioned I I've conducted on
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the relationship I've written um about on the relationship between international law and the subject of
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past and in Liberation and this this work includes an article in the Palestine yearbook of international law
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and also related uh policy brief that summarized um some of the ideas I'm
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going to to set out today concerning the applicability of the international law
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of self-determination and the international law and the use of falls to the question of the existential
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legality of the the exercise of controlled by Israel Over the West Bank
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and Gaza I'm currently preparing um a legal opinion which will address
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this issue as a general matter the general issue of legality or illegality
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of the um what will be we've probably described
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characterized by the general assembly as the occupation over the West Bank
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including East Jerusalem and Gaza in anticipation of
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the ga votes that may happen any day now um uh requesting an advisory opinion of
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the icj on that subject so that will be hopefully released at the same time the
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ga vote happens so watch this space I'll I'll publicize it uh on on the usual
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places um so what I'd like to do today is to set out my thesis about the interplay
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between self-determination and the use of force uh so obviously the starting point is
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the exercise of Domination by Israel Over Gaza and the West Bank
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and um setting aside the without prejudice to the particular
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legal test in occupation law when it comes to the law on the use of force uh
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this this clearly does meet the test for being a use of force which is the
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international law euphemism for war which includes uh occupation and the exercise of
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control uh further through military means so it doesn't just evolve as it were active hostilities which is a sort
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of common misconception about uh what IT addresses
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um and with Gaza in particular um the the exercise of control uh
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through military force obviously has continued I don't need to tell uh this group uh how that has happened so I will
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bother with that um uh the facts are well known the the
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point to make legally is that this amounts to a sort of reconfigured
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uh ongoing use of force exercised by Israel Over the Gaza as a territory the
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territory of Gaza and its population quite apart from
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when it is then periodically supplemented by further means and
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methods of warfare such as military incursions and uh taking other military
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action uh obviously in response to Rocket attacks mowing the grass General
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degradation efforts targeted assassinations Etc right so
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those incidents are not the only moments when Israel is using force in
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international law terms with respect to Gaza it is an ongoing situation just as
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it is in the West Bank including East Jerusalem so it is this this set for present legal
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purposes the same even though obviously manifested in different ways and of
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course different ways in the West Bank in different parts of the West Bank
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um obviously again this doesn't need to be
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um argued for in this group uh the Palestinian people have a universally
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accepted to have the right of self-determination and the me the significance of that
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is of course the right to be free from any external domination including occupation or other forms of
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non-sovereign based territorial control which of this nature prevents the full
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day Factor exercise of this right uh so the domination needs to end in order
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for the right to be exercised this right operates and exists simply by
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virtue of the Palestinian people being entitled to it so it's not something therefore that depends on anyone else
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agreeing to this it is understood to be a right something which might depend on the agreement of
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another actor is by definition not a right now the anti-colonial form of external
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self-determination and adopted around the middle of the 20th century
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and applicable to the Palestinian people was of course a repudiation of the
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concept of trusteeship over people according to that concept
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people were ostensibly potentially to be granted their freedom by Colonial
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authorities if and when they were deemed ready by those authorities
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the anti-colonial self-determination rule which was the international legal basis for recognizing decolonization
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scrapped this approach in favor of an automatic right
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the new rule was and is rooted in a basic entitlement of people to Freedom
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not readiness so in the words of the uh U.N general
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assembly in resolution 1514 and 1916 inadequacy of preparedness should never
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serve as a pretext for delaying Independence and this right operates regardless of
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whether the authority depriving the people of their ability to exercise self-rule agrees to relinquish control
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so necessarily then this form of Freedom through the end of a certain form of
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external control is to be realized immediately and automatically without preconditions such
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as standards having to be met first on whatever basis so for example an
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agreement with or approval by Israel the UN the quartet of the states Etc
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and in relation to whatever subject matter so governance Readiness security issues undertakings uh to Israel Etc
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now whether or not the meeting of these standards an agreement or support for arrangements to end the occupation by
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these actors are or are not important and desirable
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in a more General sense is not the point the point is that the meeting of these
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standards and the agreement by these actors is not something that the realization of
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external self-determination is supposed to be lawfully made contingent on
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thank you now although the rights have Palestinian self-determination in international law
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the necessary consequences of this which is that the person in people should be able to exercise the right free
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of Israeli control is near universally recognized
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there is often a lack of acknowledgment of those logical next steps that I just set out
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concerning uh the end of that control so many commentators and states
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affirm the writer policy self-determination only in the abstract
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as if it does not then have some material significance to the ending of the control exercise by Israel Over Gaza
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of the West Bank so it's as though the sort of thought process has been started but they're not taken to its logical
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conclusion in some cases this position is adopted on the basis of
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a view that the control over Gaza and the West Bank can and should be maintained for
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security purposes and or relatedly that its end should
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depend on a peace agreement that would include security guarantees for Israel
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obviating the need to maintain the occupation for these purposes so setting aside all of the other
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potential reasons why Israel might continue with the occupation notably of
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the West Bank in for example obviously in the context of potential territorial claims
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we are what I want to focus on now is the particular defensive security
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basis for maintaining the occupation of both places
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so the question I want to ask is does international law permit Israel to
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maintain its military control over Gaza and the West Bank
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notwithstanding the the necessary in in the necessary impediment this causes to
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the realization of self-determination on this security definitive basis
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thank you now as I've said already the the control exercise by Israel Over Gaza
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and the West Bank is as a military action is in the in the terminology of international law a use of force which
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is the international law euphemism for war which includes the kinds of uh
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actions uh and exercise of authority in both places
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um now the the only legal grounds for a state to to control territory that
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doesn't fall apart of its Sovereign territory and which is either the territory of another state or is a
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non-state self-determination unit so you can pick your options there in the
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case of Palestine um through the use of force is I if firstly the host Sovereign
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entity has validly given its permission and in my broader work I deal with Oslo
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and I won't address that here unless I have questions about it I'm my
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conclusion is Oslo does not somehow provide valid consent uh to to somehow
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the continuation of the occupation um or the UN Security Council has given its
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Authority for this on the chapter 7 of the human Charter that also has not been the case and I in
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my broader work which will be set out in that legal opinion I deal with resolution 242 in particular
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and then thirdly this is what I will address uh now is it's a legally valid
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exercise of self-defense according to the international law on the use of force
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and it seems to me that that really is the only conceivable basis
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on which the uh exercise and Military control through the use of force over
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girls on the West Bank could could be lawfully
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um Justified now
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so what is the legal test here so and forgive me if I'm I'm really covering you know for for many if not
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all of you that that you know the kind of basic International or 101 here
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um the use of force in self-defense is only legally permitted according to the international law on
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the use of force the yassan if there is an actual or an imminent threat of an
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armed attack and that the use of force involved which of course here is it is
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uh we know the realities and what that involves and when it comes to the
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exercise of control military control over regarding the West Bank is a necessary and proportionate response to
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that attack or the imminent threat of attack now the question of whether this uh an
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actual or imminent threat of an armed attack meeting the legal test existed in 1967 and the introduction of the
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occupation as a consequence of the broader defensive response to it was necessary
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and proportionate is um of course disputed but in my work
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and in the legal opinion I assume for the sake of argument that that test was
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met then but of course if it was not then the occupation has been existentially
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illegal in use of false terms from the very beginning so proceeding on the hypothetical basis
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that there was a lawful basis for introducing the occupation in 1967. some
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commentators including International lawyers seem to suggest that provided this that existed then
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matter of legality has been resolved not only for that moment but also for the
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continued operation of the occupation no further analysis is needed as time
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moves forward in other words the occupation can continue without this continuation itself needing
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to meet any justification test so it's really left to the occupier to Israel to
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decide if and when they wish to end the occupation by occupation I mean the exercise of
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control exercise including the nature of the control exercise over Gaza
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since the withdrawal of boots on the ground
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um a more common view is that there is a legal requirement to any occupation
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presumably because of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people but that the test for when this
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should end the end should come or put differently to test the occupation has
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to meet in order to continue to be justified is something different from the general
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Yos and balance test that I mentioned a moment ago specifically some have suggested that
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the occupation can continue until there is a peace agreement
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now bearing in mind that this kind of new test
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that seems to have been kind of conjured up out of nowhere in legal terms given that it could enable the occupier
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to prolong the occupation by simply failing to gauge in good faith
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efforts to pursue an agreement a seemingly tighter version of this
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approach is that the occupation is permitted to continue until there is a
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peace agreement provided that the occupier is making all possible good fake efforts to achieve that agreement
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this is not the international law test requirement to meet the general adbellum
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test that I mentioned before is an ongoing one in any continuing use of
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force including a military occupation commentators and policy makers seem to
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overlook that the use of force requiring justification on this basis is not
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simply the initial period of invasion that precedes and enables an occupation
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it is also then the operation of the occupation including when it's reconfigured as was the case with Gaza
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and of course post Oslo in the West Bank since the conduct of an occupation quite
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separately from the circumstances of its introduction is itself a use of force
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so in Consequence the test remains on an ongoing basis needing to establish an
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actual or an imminent threat of an armed attack and the type of force being used
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being necessary and proportionate to that if the test is not met then the military
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control exercised by Israel Over Gaza and the West Bank is illegal even in the
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absence of a peace agreement thus whether or not a peace agreement has been reached and whether or not the
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occupying state is taking all good faith efforts to reach such an agreement are
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not by themselves dispositive of whether or not the occupation is or is not
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legally Justified this is not to say that Israel is not
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required in international law to make good faith efforts to reach a peace agreement
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it's just that this is irrelevant to the question of whether Israel has a legal
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entitlement to maintain its military control over Gaza and the West Bank
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commentators and policy makers who wish to incentivize Israel which seems to be
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what is partly going on here to come to the negotiating table cannot invoke the right to maintain the
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occupation as a bargaining chip since the right does not depend on a
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willingness or otherwise to negotiate but in an entirely different legal test
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now Beyond Israel's particular episodic responses to
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rocket attacks from Gaza the ongoing military control exercise by
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Israel Over the West Bank and Gaza if it's understood
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as I say which is really the only justification that bears any
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relationship to something that might be compatible within such a law if it's understood in defensive terms
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is not of course about responding to an actual or an imminent attack as I say
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outside of responding to uh the rocket attacks from Gaza
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rather it is preventative self-defense
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using Force to stop a threat from emerging either at all
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so of course the control exercised in the West Bank Linked In the case of area
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a to security cooperation with the PA or to a large extent
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as in the control exercise by over Gaza so another element to this is to
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understand the occupation as a mechanism to prevent the existence of another
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fully autonomous Arab State at Israel's borders out of a generalized defensive concern
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in relation to this state so here potentially the point of the
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occupation is in effect to prevent a fully functioning Palestinian state for
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defensive security purposes obviously also in the case of the West
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Bank the use the use of force is sometimes also explained in defensive terms as a means of protecting settlers
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and settlements and this again can be understood to be
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not only in response to actual or imminent attacks but also more long-term
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preemption and prevention of emergent threats
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pre-emptive or preventative self-defense is not a valid
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basis for using force in self-defense in international law
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thus the occupation in general and these actions taken in relation to subtlers
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and settlements in particular in the West Bank cannot be legally Justified on
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this basis so the analysis that I've suggested is
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has proceeded of course on the hypothetical basis that there was a your sidebellum justification for
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introducing the occupation in 67. this conclusion not meant on illegality is
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based on the absence of the necessary actual or or imminent or threat of an
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imminent armed attack meeting the relevant test or the existence of such a threat but
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the disproportional relationship between the occupation and the threat in the period since 67.
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this conclusion is arrived at from the Manifest impossibility of such
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a situation being in existence on a continued basis for anything other than
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a short period given the narrow nature of the test in terms of both the threat required and
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the requirement of proportionality that the occupation must meet in order to be
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justified even if a threat meeting the test is in existence
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so the effect of this analysis is that there is no lawful basis for Israel to
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maintain its military control over Gaza and the West Bank
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or to put this differently there is no ability for it to lawfully impede the
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Palestinian right of self-determination through this action
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as a general matter and in the specific context in the West Bank of protecting
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Israeli settlers and settlements in consequence then the exercise and
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ability to control over Gaza and the West Bank including issues 11. is
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existentially illegal as a breach of the international law on the use of force
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and the law of self-determination and Israel is required to end it
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immediately this latter requirement of immediate termination is a necessary requirement
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of that right of the Palestinian people to have their right realizing instantly
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and necessarily not subject to any qualifications as I mentioned before
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now the nature of the breach of international law here is such as to meet the definition of
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aggression in international law the term aggression
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um is uh usually used as a synonym for a
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breach of the international law on the use of force occasionally as a subset of such
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breaches that are of a particular grave nature insofar as that latter subset definition
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is concerned the breach here meets and exceeds the threshold
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it meets it with the existence of an unlawful exercise or a use of force in
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your balance terms and then it exceeds it through factors I haven't mentioned
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already but I cover in the uh other work uh concerning aggravating factors linked
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to annexation uh prolonged duration and egregiously abusive conduct
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aggression is illegal in terms of both the responsibility of the state of
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Israel and also in terms of individual criminal responsibility
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the crime of aggression in the Roman statute for the international criminal court
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is limited to aggression which because of its and to quote its character
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gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the charter of the United
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Nations so for the same reasons that the breach of international law here Falls within
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the occasionally used definition of aggression that covers a subset of the
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breaches of the law on the use of force the illegal nature of the use of force meets this ICC definition of the
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individual crime of aggression thus in terms of the definition the
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crime of aggression is being committed by certain individual Israelis
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the question left to be determined and Beyond the scope of my work is who these
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particular individuals are in terms of meeting the relevant leadership test
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that is part of that definition of the crime of aggression
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to finish and in parenthesis what is left of course is a right to use force
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in self-defense in response to actual or imminent
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attacks on Israel and here I mean Israel within its
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borders not Israel in the form of settlers and settlements or its presence
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in territory that it claims to have annexed but has not such as East
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Jerusalem attacks on that Israel from the West Bank or Gaza for example
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rocket attacks from Gaza whether the responses that have happened
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here meet the necessary tests for legacy is beyond the scope of
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the work that I had been conducting since that has been on the general existential legitimacy of the everyday
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overall control exercised over both places as distinct from these particular
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episodes of defensive response but there is a link between the two in
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the sense that the absence of a broader ongoing right to use force in
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self-defense over the same area so obagaza for example means that these
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episodes for example responses to Rocket attacks their legality cannot be folded into a
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general entitlement to use Force when their lawfulness in ant Bellum terms is
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being determined they must stand or fall legally as individual incidents
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so this is significant legally for how the legal test operates for example in terms of what constitutes an armed
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attack and questions of questions of imminence Etc um so although as I mentioned in the
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context of Gaza the occurrence of these individual incidents is not the only moment where Israel is using Force
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the point is that there's no valid legal basis for the broader ongoing use of
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force and so it when it comes to assessing the legality of the responses to them by
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Israel these incidents have to be addressed in isolation
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thank you thank you very much thank you well I I'll start with two very brief
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clarifications or questions if I can so first um and these are very I think uh softball
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questions but uh maybe it's a good as a start um do you if you can please clarify whether
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your position [Music] um changes at all with regard to the West Bank of Gaza and or is it basically
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the same analysis that applies in in both cases um
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that's great that's one question um and I think it I think it is the basically the same analysis but I just
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want to make sure I understand um
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with regard to uh the point made of a lack of
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um the rights to uh exercise defense against Israeli citizens beyond the
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green line settlers um what can if you can explain what that
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means is is any uh use of force uh whether by the military or by other
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police forces to defend the lives of those people it doesn't mean that that
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is a illegal according to your position and if not what are the parameters of
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uh such a defense uh such security uh operations
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and also can I add to that uh or also on this relationship between West Bank and Gaza
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sounded like you're saying hi it sounded like you're saying that uh
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it is possible that israeli's responses to Rocket attacks from Gaza would be
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considered uh legitimate or legal in in in in terms
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of the use of force requirement um uh so
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so what what in what sense Israel's uh relation with Gaza at the moment or
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in what sense of control do you mean in relation to Gaza I can understand this in relation to the West Bank very
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clearly but less in the in relation to God um
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so is it like is it do you see that the control connected do
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you see the control over Gaza and the West Bank at the same time or let's you know if
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there's a different kind of solution to this to the problem in Gaza in in the West Bank the Gaza Remains the Same it
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remains you know a separate entity
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I think I have a question if I make um the analysis is the strip more like a
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clarification because you say that the self-determination on the on the
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exterior sense I didn't really get it but um is automated or is inherent
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so but it doesn't like really um appear in in in the world or in reality
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because let's say just azawad in Mali thought about this declared independence 2015 the French game helped the
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emollient military to express it and there is no self-determination no automated self-determination same with
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Scotland for instance with the idea of self-intervention of Scottish people but it wasn't realized because of I don't
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know because the the vote didn't came above 50 percent so how did how did how does it relate to
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the automated aspect of uh self-determination
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great question so um is it is it the same analysis West Bank
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and Gaza and which maybe links also to Karen's question also um about the nature of control so
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essentially yes right but the the work of course then elaborates on on why it's
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a yes right the use of force in international law there's no one-size fits at all uh definition just as with
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occupation as well there is an overall notion of effective control but within that a variety of different Arrangements
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can meet the test and therefore of course the issue is not
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just you know comparing Gaza in the West Bank but looking at different areas of the West Bank right and whether the you
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know the occupation uh is understood to operate across the West Bank in its
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entirety uh or where they're somehow a subset of it uh perhaps not including
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area a the answer is no the legal test is sufficiently Broad to Encompass the
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nature of the overall exercise of control by Israel in both places
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um and even though it then is instantiated in very different ways uh so for example
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in Gaza the issue is the obviously The Siege uh being ex together with Israel
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having an exclusively determinative role in determining the entry and exit
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of any and all people and food and material items and you know including medical supplies the exclusive control
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over airspace and Maritime territory the control of the water and electricity
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Supply and the ability to reintroduce boots on the ground from its own
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territory without any impediment so in you know both sort of
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West Bank Post Oslo and Gaza post Federal sort of
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essentially legal terms amount to a reconfiguration of the nature of
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Israel's control exercise and control in those two places
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which ultimately does not alter the fact that it constitutes
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um a use of force that then still then Falls to be legally determined according
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to that international law uh framework uh the question about the
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um settlers um so the the the consequence of this analysis
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is that which is sometimes hard to appreciate because the dominant normative Paradigm
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through which the occupation is is commonly addressed is in relation to its
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ostensibly Humane conduct right so the question is applying IHL and maybe most
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of human rights law and saying you know in individual incidents is Israel behaving in a way that
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complies with the relevant IHL usually it's only IHL standards even though
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everyone supposedly adopts a you know integrated approach of human rights law but in any event standards that
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supposedly regulate the conduct of the occupation not its existence
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what that analysis misses is that the very exercise of authority itself is
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unlawful so in one in that fundamental sense it
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really doesn't matter if Israel complies with IHL even if it did it would still
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have no right to exercise Authority there and that therefore has consequences equally for the position of
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uh settlers Israel's uh um uh actions to protect
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them because Israel has no um uh valid legal basis even to be even
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to be on that land in the first place it would it the situation is like in any
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other situation where a state is concerned about the welfare of its
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Nationals in another state right and those Nationals may be in trouble they
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may be in danger uh they mean need new protection there is no international law
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basis for that state to lawfully use military action in the other state to protect its
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Nationals it doesn't have that on the international law on the use of force
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for example by assimilating the state's Nationals into the state so that somehow
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an attack on the national is an attack on the state that has no legal basis in international law
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the protection of the settlers could be enabled
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by implementing the legal obligation which is to end their unlawful presence
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in the first place so Israel has an option Israel is not faced unlike in other
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situations where sometimes there is no means to protect Estates Nationals
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overseas there isn't there are means so international law provides those needs
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and indeed the means that international law provides to Israel happen to
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correspond to what actually international law requires of Israel which is to end the satellite the
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settlements and the presence of the settlers in the Palestinian territories
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um self-determination um so
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obviously one of the issues with self-determination is that it's sort of
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a term like sovereignty or you know like love which means all things to all
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people and uh lots of very different and mutually incompatible definitions can be
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used um and uh so the question we always have to face is you know what do we mean when
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we use it and you know on what basis so I'm using it in the international law
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sense of an of an external rights of self-determination the right of a group of people
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to determine their external status which is to say to decide whether they remain
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within or separate from the authority of the the Honda
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now although many groups in the world sorry about the background noise here
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um I don't have any control over it um many groups in the world
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um aspire to that uh and claim it very few
40:48
are given it in international law and the Palestinian people are in that
40:56
special class because of their uh
41:01
being a people of a territory that we're subject to Colonial rule under the
41:08
Ottomans and then the British in the first half of the 20th century so it's the mandates were a form
41:15
for the purposes of this international law of self-determination
41:20
mandated territories were a type of I mean not only in that legal sense they
41:26
were colonies right but they the fact that they were called mandates is is irrelevant to the application of the
41:34
international law of external self-determination that emerged in the middle of the 20th century and became
41:41
applicable to Colonial uh territories generally
41:46
you know whether it's they they are designated as mandates or then of course
41:52
under the um the trusteeship system or other forms of colonies which therefore
41:57
were described characterized again euphemistically as non-self-governing
42:02
territories so the so unlike the Scots uh uh the Palestinian people have this
42:11
extent right of external self-determination and
42:17
um other situations including the Scots other referenda
42:23
um might be uh discussions might happen at the discretion of the state
42:30
uh within which that group group is located the difference here is that it's
42:35
it's not about the uh the discretion of the
42:41
um the authority within which the people are located it's a right
42:47
so the so the Scottish people do not have a right of external self-determination they they've been
42:52
given it in the form of that vote that gave them the option to decide whether to go for it or not but they did not
43:00
have a right to be given that um the Palestinian people do in
43:08
international law I'm not sure does that answer your
43:13
question or were you about the skills it's a bit a bit coherent because when you when you look on on different
43:20
National movements and when we look on the on the mandate system specifically you said the the British standard
43:26
because the raised on the terror or of the British mandate was to establish a a
43:32
national home for the Jewish people it's in the it's in the the constitution of
43:38
the Mandate so the the the international recognition of
43:44
self-discrimination for a specific uh person of specific people or group is
43:52
not really coherent in that sense because you say that Palestinians do have that right but Scots don't have
43:58
that right because they're not in the same in the same situation but looking empirically they're both people with
44:04
national identities and a desire for for Independence or self-determination absolutely this is not uh I'm not
44:13
suggesting that this is fair and just and that the the groups who get it
44:19
um uh deserve it more than the groups who don't in terms of what international law
44:26
the international legal position uh adopts I'm not saying that I'm simply explaining what the legal position is in
44:33
international law on the on the question of the Palestine Mondays um since you raise it
44:40
um I have a new article to play up to drop in the Journal of the history of
44:45
international law which is about the Palestine mandate and the question of the incorporation of
44:52
Balfour into that mandate agreement that you mentioned which was a sort of a
44:59
agreed last uh not last year a century ago last year and but but then
45:07
a century ago sorry a century ago this year 1922 next year is the Centenary of when
45:16
it entered into force and became a legally violent instrument so in in many
45:21
ways to next year is the Centenary of the legal instrument that paved the way
45:29
for the creation of Israel um and
45:34
that article discusses the problem the legal problem
45:41
of the League of Nations Council departing from the provisions of the
45:49
League of Nations Covenant in purporting to incorporate the Balfour
45:56
on The Taking of obviously issued before these Arrangements were adopted into a
46:04
binding legal instrument and my argument is that the council did
46:12
not have the legal competence under the Treaty of Versailles under the under the
46:17
um uh Covenant of the League of Nations to bypass article 22 of the Covenant
46:26
and acted ultravirus in terms of the international law of uh uh the law of
46:34
international organizations in purporting to do that which has consequences then for the
46:42
legal cover that that instrument as I say adopted
46:49
entering it at ends into force in 1923 gave to the UK when it came to what it
46:56
did in the in its administration of uh the mandate
47:02
sorry just just to finish the point about self-determination
47:08
this that that was a uh of course before self-determination became accepted as a
47:14
general proposition that applicable to all Colonial territories right that came later
47:20
but what significant is that there was this earlier
47:26
essentially a form of external self-determination although that word is not used in the Mandate in article 22
47:35
the Covenant applicable to so-called A-Class mandates which Palestine was one
47:42
all right Ralph I think we the terms of my own mandate here would hold you uh
47:48
with us until 3 45 local time which is uh yes can I ask us a very quick
47:53
question uh Ralph will decide because he he has the time constraints do you have like uh two more minutes yes yes yes
48:01
okay fine fine by me so so I wanted to ask another question about the
48:06
temporality that you describe here in terms of like how every day it is this
48:11
you know use of authority and this illegality of the use of authority oh uh
48:16
the exercise of authority and uh and the legality how does it happen but I'm not
48:22
going to ask it's a larger question the the the shorter question is what is the institutional context in which you're
48:28
making this argument to um and what's the chances of the
48:33
argument to be heard and to be you know used in an Institutional context
48:43
one thing though okay most immediately there is this
48:49
general assembly vote that's about to happen which may which may be request an advisor opinion of the icj to ask this
48:56
question right so it seems to me that when I've been working on this and I've been writing about it so now I should
49:02
provide this analysis because it's going to have to be determined by by the icj
49:07
as a sort of follow-up to the wall advisory opinion uh but also because
49:15
other other mechanisms of scrutiny and accountability in relation to
49:21
um the situation in the West Bank and Gaza are fixated on an exclusive focus
49:28
on the conduct of the occupation and they don't want to go anywhere near and will not address whether the occupation
49:34
should end so there is this there is this um
49:40
acute dissonance between the position that is articulated by the
49:48
Palestinian people a desire a a an assertion of their right
49:54
and freedom and the mental occupation and the exclusive focus when it comes to
50:00
the mechanisms of international law and accountability which is to entirely
50:06
ignore that and to focus simply on how the occupation is conducted and all the
50:13
attention and all of the energy and resources goes into that latter question exclusively
50:19
and um what's striking to me is that this
50:26
includes so you would expect this from say the icrc or the red crescent or the
50:31
you know the the the organization in Israel um uh because that's their their their
50:38
mandates Limited in that way but other bodies do not have such a
50:43
limitation human rights bodies for example because they're implementing human rights law and self-determination
50:49
is part of human rights law in common article one of the two components so one
50:55
thing that's it's struck me in doing this work is going through the
51:00
um uh the the country Reporting System under the two covenants when Israel is
51:07
before the human rights the committee that implements both of those two human rights continents and and in both cases
51:17
the committee of course addresses the full spectrum of issues between the river and the Sea as they relate to
51:24
Israel's obligations and human rights law applying the human rights obligations territorially and
51:30
extraterritorially but what's striking is they don't address this issue of whether the
51:36
occupation should end on and if so on what basis even though that is the requirement of the law of
51:42
self-determination and indeed they
51:48
in a kind of torturous way have of course have to think about address self-determination uh but only
51:56
address it as it were within Israel when it comes to
52:03
Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel so some of their
52:08
scrutiny of Israel has been about the way the position of Palestinian Arab
52:13
citizens of Israel in self-determination terms right so considering and
52:19
criticizing their position their treatment by Israel partly as a
52:25
denial of their right of self-determination as Israeli citizens
52:31
and of course that is an incredible um uh to to only address
52:36
self-determination in that limited way is a A peculiar approach when it comes
52:45
to the situation of Palestinians because essentially what the two commissions are saying is we are only going to address
52:50
your right to self-determination when it comes to
52:56
essentially the self-determination right of the people of Israel right so it's kind of gaslighting you
53:04
know these bodies are essentially saying we are
53:09
you've come to us for scrutiny about the way you're treated and what we're going to we're going to use the language of
53:15
self-determination and we're only going to apply it and understand it and frame
53:21
it in those terms and it seems to me that is happening
53:27
because of this inability and unwillingness to address the implications in self-determination terms
53:35
of the occupation so they can only think about self-determination as as the
53:40
self-determination of the Israeli people and therefore our Palestinians only
53:46
insofar as they are Israeli citizens
53:51
okay thanks Ralph so much um it was really um very very interesting Target
53:58
um we look forward to hopefully being in touch with regard to a possible collection of essays
54:04
um you will be free to join us or not I mean uh but but we do uh hope to hope to
54:10
proceed with this project in the more Gaza specific uh vein I'm saying this to myself as well because I also had a talk
54:18
that was not uh so clearly focused on about that um thanks so much
54:23
um and we'll be in touch thank you so much all right bye bye take care
